39_J_Edwards

PART IV
SECTION XIII
Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is
metaphysical and abstruse.

IT has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles, that in their reasonings, they run into nice
scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties, and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is
possible, that after the former manner, it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have endeavored to
confute the Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning
this, I would observe the following things:
I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced
to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute
or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what
language it is delivered in. And for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his
arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments could not be substantial, because they
were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, physics, logic, or
mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk? But whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly
conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against the papists, to
disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity, that it
should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove, that
the rational soul is not corporeal, that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not
weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so, as to show
their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysics only that we can
demonstrate that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable. That he is not ignorant, or forgetful; that it is
impossible for him to lie, or be unjust; and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed,
we have no strict demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics, we can have no
proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of
the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of
the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be
brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct, and determinate meaning of the terms
I use should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet,
metaphysical.
II. If the reasoning, which has been made use of, be in some sense metaphysical, it will not follow, that therefore it
must need be abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing
reasoning, at least to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse definitions or
distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such
abstraction and subtlety, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and darkness. There is no high
degree of refinement and abstruse speculation, in determining that a thing is not before it is, and so cannot be the
cause of itself. Or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or
direct it; or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference. That
preference and equilibrium never coexist and that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, consisting in
indifference. And that so far as the will is determined by motives, exhibiting and operating previous to the act of the
will, so far it is not determined by the act of the will itself. That nothing can begin to be, which before was not,
without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their causes,
and are connected with them. That virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better, for the strength of inclination with
which it is practiced, and the difficulty, which thence arises of doing otherwise. That when it is already infallibly
known that the thing will be, it is not contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly said,
notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be
observed of many other things, which belong to the foregoing reasoning.
If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but mere metaphysical sophistry. And that it must
be so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and while that is hid in the obscurity
which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to say, "Here is,
indeed, something tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it. For who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men
are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded, for those volition’s which are not from themselves, and of
whose existence they are not the causes. Men may refine, as much as they please, and advance the abstract notions,
and make out a thousand seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understandings; yet there can be no satisfaction in
such doctrine as this: the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it."
[A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessity are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy,
using words without a meaning, or begging the question. I do not know what kind of necessity any authors to whom
he may have reference are advocates for; or whether they managed their arguments well or ill. As to the arguments I
have made use, if they are quibbles they may be shown to be so; such knots are capable of being untied, and the
trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons
I have relied upon, I shall have just occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations.
I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined; and if there be nothing but begging the question, or mere
logomachy, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest and shown how the seeming strength of the argument
depends on my using words without a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in
an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons rest mainly on such a foundation: and then,
I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly
exposed for my obstinacy.
The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy and sophistry, to experience.
A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose, that all men have the
same human faculties; so a man may well argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that show the
nature of these faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good a right to allege his experience
as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my
body, in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those motions; and that my will has
some command of my thoughts; and that the acts of my will are my own, i.e. that they are acts of my will, the
volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others
experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally determined by itself: or that, my will
first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of the
determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition arises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in
myself, by experience, of this nature: and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of
any such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed.
It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce
them, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect, and this, for ought I know, may make
some imagine, that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to
determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being
accidentally without a cause because I first found myself possessed of being, I had knowledge of a cause of my
being.]
I humbly conceive, that such an objector, if he has capacity, and humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient, impartially
and thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really what he would be at. And indeed, his difficulty
is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly
understood, nor carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he has candor and patience enough, and
does not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair. — He would have a man’s volition be from
himself. Let it be from himself, most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from its own choice;
how will that help the matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself (an ill choice, for
instance) blameworthy, according to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner; that is,
from his own choice? But the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice: his choice is not
the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter.
If it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from himself voluntarily: and if so, he is surely no more to blame, than
if it were not from himself at all. It is vanity to pretend, it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but
metaphysical refinement and subtlety, and so attended with obscurity and uncertainly.
If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blameworthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is
also, that it must be from something bad in himself, a bad choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is,
that this bad choice or disposition going before this, from whence this arises: for that is a ridiculous absurdity,
running us into an immediate contradiction, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and
never comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was demonstrated
before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volition’s and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature
of them. An evil thing being FROM a man, or from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original
notion we have of blameworthiness. It is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be from
us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense.
When a thing is from a man, in that sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his will IS
IN IT: so far as the will is in it, blame is in it, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to
inquire whether the bad will be FROM a bad will: there is no consideration of the original of that bad will; because
according to our natural apprehension, blame originally consists in it. Therefore a thing being from a man, is a
secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill desert. Because those things, in our external actions, are most
properly said to be from us, which are from our choice; and no other external actions, but those that are from us in
this sense, have the nature of blame; and they indeed, not so properly because they are from us, as because we are
in them, i.e. our wills are in them; not so much because they are from some property of ours, as because they are
our properties.
However, all these external actions being truly from us as their cause, and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and
in the common affairs of life, to speak of men’s actions and conduct which we see, and which affect human society,
as deserving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously
taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these overt
acts of men; to the running of everything into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion. And, therefore, I observe,
III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended), that the proof of the doctrine which has been
maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the Arminian
scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness for its defense, is supported by the plain dictates of common
sense; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have
confounded things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the light of plain
truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended
demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as self-determination, and
sovereignty of the will. And the metaphysical sense they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action,
agency, etc. quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech; and which, as they use them, are without
any consistent meaning, or any manner of distinct consistent ideas. [It is] as far from it as any of the abstruse terms
and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic philosophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of
the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what
they use without knowing what they mean themselves. They are pure metaphysical sounds, without any ideas
whatsoever in their minds to answer them; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in
the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them; because their explanations destroy
themselves. No such notions as imply self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a great many ways, can subsist
in the mind; as there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without
dimensions, or of any effect which is before its cause. — Arminians improve these terms, as terms of art, and in their
metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree.
Thus, instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth and in all
ages, have, consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in
indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity,
and manifold gross inconsistency. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much,
in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; these, through
their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indifference to be essential to all virtue and vice.
So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but metaphysical confusion, into many
principles about moral agency, blame praise, reward, and punishment, which are, as has been shown, exceeding
contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common life.