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Freedom Of The Will
By Johnathan Edwards

AUTHOR’S PREFACE Part I
WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS
BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE

Part 1, Section 1 Concerning the nature of the will

PART I, SECTION II Concerning the determination of the will

PART I, SECTION III Concerning the meaning of the terms necessity, impossibility, inability, etc.; and of contingence
PART I, SECTION IV Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity, and inability.
PART I, SECTION V Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency.

PART II
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH
SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE
ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY
SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

SECTION I, Showing the manifest inconsistency of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will’s self-determining power
SECTION II, Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
SECTION III, Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence.
SECTION IV, Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
SECTION V, Showing that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently
SECTION VI, Concerning the will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind.
SECTION VII, Concerning the notion of liberty of will, consisting in indifference.
SECTION VIII, Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity.
SECTION IX, Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding.
SECTION X, Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistency of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings about the freedom of the will.
SECTION XI, The evidence of God’s certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.
SECTION XII, God’s certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity.
SECTION XIII, Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.

Part III
SECTION I, God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.
SECTION I, The Acts of the Will of the human soul of Jesus Christ, necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praise-worthy, rewardable, &c
SECTION III , The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness.
SECTION IV, Command and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey.
SECTION V, That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which, is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered.
SECTION VI, Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency.
SECTION VII, Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions.

PART IV
THE REASONING OF THE ARMINIAN VIEW OF LIBERTY

SECTION I, The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause, but their nature.
SECTION II, The falseness and inconsistency, of that metaphysical notion of action and agency, which seems to be generally entertained, by the defenders of the Arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc.
SECTION III The reasons why some think it contrary to common sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either praise or blame.
SECTION IV, It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment.
SECTION V, Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religion.
SECTION VI, Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of faith, and the opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
SECTION VII, Concerning the necessity of the divine will
SECTION VIII, Some further objections against the moral necessity of God’s volitions considered.
SECTION IX, Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin.
SECTION X, Concerning sin’s first entrance into the world.
SECTION XI, Of a supposed inconsistency between these principles and God’s moral character.
SECTION XII, Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousness
SECTION XIII, Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supposed, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.