A Vindication Of The Cause of God and Truth

                             The
              CAUSE OF GOD AND TRUTH.

                                     Part 4
                            Chapter 6—A Vindication
                              OF A Book Entitled
                         The Cause of God and Truth

Relating To The Sense Of The Ancient Christian Writers, About Some Things In Controversy With
The Arminians, From The Cavils, Calumnies, And Defamations Of Mr. Henry Heywood, Etc. HAVING
published, some time ago, an Answer to the Birmingham Dialogue-Writer’s Second Part, I annexed a
postscript to it, relating to some charges brought against me by one Mr. Henry Heywood, in an
introduction of his to a translation of Dr. Whitby’s Treatise of Original Sin. This postscript,
containing my answer to the said charges, it seems, is not relished by him and his friends, and has
produced a defamatory pamphlet, wrote either by himself or some of his party, entitled A Defence
of Dr. Whitby’s Treatise of Original Sin, etc. I say, wrote either by himself, or some of his party—
for I greatly suspect that this piteous performance is done by some other person or persons, and
published under his name; since, if my information is right, this man was gone for Carolina some
months before the publication of this pamphlet; which, had it been drawn up and finished by himself
before his departure, might have been published in ten days’ time. The temper and genius of a
certain person, not very remarkable for candor and good-nature, are pretty visible in it; but,
whoever be the author or authors, revisers and editors of it, they ought to look upon themselves
concerned in the guilt and shame arising from the blunders and scandal which are manifestly in it, as
will appear by the following examination of it: —
I. The first charge brought against me is mistranslation, of which three instances are given, and to
which I have replied; the sum of the difference between us is, I have rendered plaga, in Irenaeus,
plague; this man, sometimes wound; and, at another time, sore, and sometimes disease; I have
interpreted recenseatur, in Tertullian, re-reckoned, or reckoned anew; he, enrolled anew; I have
translated damnatio, in the same author, damnation, he condemnation. I shall not contend with him
about words: the reader may choose and prefer which translation he pleases. What is more material,
is the pertinence of these passages to the point in hand, the sense of them, and whether any injury is
done thereunto. And,
1. As to the passage in Irenaeus, whether antiqua serpentis plaga be rendered the old blow, or
stroke, or wound, or sore, or plague, or disease of the serpent, it certainly intends some hurt or
mischief done by the old serpent, the devil, to our first parents, and to all mankind. This man says
that Irenaeus, by this pestilential disorder (and which surely, then, must be a plague,) with which
the old serpent has infected mankind, understands not original corruption, or the vitiosity whereby
man’s nature is depraved, but only death and mortality. But let the words of Irenaeus[1] be
produced and considered, which are these: “Men cannot else be saved from the old wound (the
pestilential disorder) of the serpent, nisi credant in eum, except they believe on him, who, in the
likeness of sinful flesh, was lifted up from the earth, on the tree of martyrdom, who draws all things
to himself, and quickens the dead.” Now, are they that believe in Christ saved by him from mortality
and death? Are they not as liable to mortality? And do they not labor under the same diseases of
body, and die a corporal death, as other men do? Are these the persons only that will be cured of
this mortal disorder, the disease of death, by a resurrection from the dead? Will there not be a
resurrection of the just and unjust, believers and unbelievers? Who then can conceive that this
should be the meaning of Irenaeus? As to the passage which Dr. Whitby cites in favor of the sense
this author from him has espoused, it makes more against him than for him; for Irenaeusc[2] does
not say that plaga, the disorder itself, but dolor plagae, “the pain of it,” or what arises from it,
“with which men was stricken in the beginning, in Adam inobediens, ‘being disobedient in Adam;’ this
is the death which God will cure, by raising us from the dead, and restoring us to our forefathers’
inheritance.” So that corporeal death, according to Irenaeus, is not the blow, the disorder itself,
but what arises from it is the fruit and effect of it. Besides, how he, or any other man, can imagine
that even mortality and death should be inflicted on men for Adam’s disobedience, unless they are
involved in the guilt of it, or that is reckoned to them, which is what we contend for, is
unaccountable. And further, it may be observed, that we have here another testimony from this
ancient writer in favor of our sentiments, when he says, “man was disobedient in Adam,” as elsewhere,
[3] “he offended in him,” which is entirely agreeable to, and confirms our sense of (Rom. 5:12), in
whom all have sinned: for the reason which[4] Dr. Whitby gives of his use of such phrases, “because
we were born of Adam after he was overcome by sin, we receive our name from him,” is exceeding
trifling, and ridiculous to the last degree, Upon the whole, since our Lord Jesus Christ saves those
that believe in him, not from mortality and a corporeal death, but as from their actual
transgressions, so from original sin; from the corruption and vitiosity of their nature; from the
damning power of it, by his death; and from its governing influence by his Spirit and grace; there is
the strongest reason to conclude that this is the sense of Irenaeus; and in this I am supported by
such great names as Austin,[5] Vossius[6] Polyander, Rivet, Walaeus, and Thysius;[7] nay, even
Feuardentius the Papist[8] though otherwise a strenuous advocate for free will, insists upon it, that
this passage of Irenaeus is a proof that the doctrine of original sin was held by the ancients before
the time of Austin; and since then, Irenaeus means the same which the Scripture calls:[9] the plague
of a man’s heart, no injury is done him by my translation.

2. The first passage out of Tertullian is owned by Dr. Whitby[10] to be more to the purpose than
some he had been considering; nor has he anything to object to the former part, of it, for which it is
chiefly cited; in which Tertullian[11] says, “Every soul is reckoned in Adam, until it is reckoned
anew, or registered in Christ; so long unclean, until it is thus registered.” Nor does our author
object to the pertinence of this testimony, which clearly expresses that the souls of men, whilst
unregenerate, are not only reckoned in Adam, as belonging to him, and under him as their head; but
are also reckoned unclean in him, being partakers of the sinful pollution, which he, by his
transgression, brought upon all mankind. Pamelius makes this to be the argument and summary of the
chapter wherein this testimony stands; Tamdiu enem animam ex carnis societate, in Adam immundam
censeri, et peccatricem, tam animam, quam carnem dici: “So long as the soul, through society with the
flesh, is reckoned unclean in Adam, both soul and body are said to be sinful;” which shows that he
thought that Tertullian’s sense was, that not only the soul is reckoned unclean in Adam, but that both
body and soul are sinful, being defiled in him; though Dr. Whitby says, his commentator makes a
doubt of it, whether, when he adds, “sinful because unclean, receiving its disgrace from society with
the flesh,” he attributes this disgrace of the soul from its society with the flesh, in respect of its
mere original, or because it made use of it as an instrument of sinning.
3. The other passage in Tertullian is,[12] “Man being at the beginning circumvented by Satan, so as
to transgress the commandment of God, and he being therefore given up to death, has defiled all
mankind which spring from him, and has also made them partakers of his damnation.” This man finds
fault with me for translating in my book, totem genus, “his whole kind,” instead of “his whole race or
offspring;” but is not Adam’s whole kind the same with all mankind? and are not all mankind his
offspring? or, are any his offspring but mankind? He calls this an egregious blunder in me; but
everybody will see that this is egregious trifling in him. A greater oversight is committed by
neglecting to translate infectum, which expresses the pollution of nature all mankind are tainted
with by Adam, and which exposes them to the same condemnation with him. But, since I have
rendered damnatio in this passage damnation, the principal controversy about it is, though this
writer says it will not bear any dispute, whether this relates to a bodily death and condemnation
only, which he suggests is Tertullian’s sense in this and in all other places; or also to the sense of
condemnation and death which passed on Adam, body and soul, for his disobedience, and on all
mankind in him, on account of the same. That Adam, according to Tertullian, was assigned to a
corporal death, and such a sentence of condemnation passed on him, is out of question. The passages
cited by this author, to which more might be added,[13] will be allowed to be proofs of this. But
then, this was not all that came upon him, nor the whole of the sentence which was pronounced on
him; for, according to this ancient writer, he was not only subject to a corporal death, but also the
image of God in him was destroyed; which lay not, as this man suggests is the sense of other ancient
writers, in the immortality of the body, but in the soul, its powers and faculties, and especially in
the power and freedom of the will, as appears from these following words of his:[14] “I find that
man was created by God, free, and possessed of his own free will and power, observing in him no
image and likeness of God more than the same form of state: for not in the face and lineaments of
the body, so different in mankind is he made after God, who is of one form or essence, but in that
substance which he has derived from God, that is, of the soul, answering to the form of God, and is
sealed with the liberty and power of his free will.” And a little lower he says, “The image and
likeness of God ought to be of his own free will and power, in which this itself, the image and
likeness of God, may be thought to be, namely, the liberty and power of free will.” He not only
affirms that the image of God in man is defaced; but that also, by his sin, he has lost communion with
God: “By not having faith,” he says,[15] “even that which he seemed to have is taken from him, the
favor of paradise, and familiarity with God, whereby he would have known all the things of God, had
he been obedient.” Now, the deprivation of the image of God, and of communion with him, through the
fall, are what we call a mortal or spiritual death. Moreover, in the very passage in dispute, Adam is
said “to render all mankind polluted,’’ and so they become partakers of his condemnation, soul and
body; hereby they become loathsome and abominable to God, and consequently liable to, and
deserving of, his everlasting wrath and displeasure; which is no other than the second death; and
that such a sentence of death passed on Adam for his offense, according to Tertullian, is clear from
the following passages:[16] “For though, because of the condition of the law, Adam is given up to
death, yet there is good hope for him, since the Lord says, Adam is become as one of us; namely,
concerning the future assumption of the man into union with the Deity.” Now, of his being delivered
from a bodily death there was no hope, for the sentence of that not only passed, but was executed
on him; but of his being delivered from the second death there is hope, through the sacrifice and
satisfaction of the Second Adam; hence he elsewhere[17] condemns Tatian as a heretic, for
asserting that “Adam could not obtain salvation; as if,” says he, “the branches could be saved, and
not the root.” And in another place he has these words:[18] “God, after so many and such great
offenses of human indiscretion deliberately committed by Adam, the father of mankind, after man
was condemned, with the dowry (the sin) of the world, after he was cast out of paradise, and subject
to death, seasonably received him to his mercy, and immediately renewed repentance within himself;
that is, as Rigaltius[19] explains it, as God repented that he had made man, he also repented that he
had condemned him; wherefore, having rescinded the sentence of former wrath, or the former
sentence of wrath and vengeance, he agreed to forgive his workmanship and image.” Now, pray what
was sententia irarum pristinarum, “the former sentence of wrath,” said to be rescinded? Could it be
the sentence of bodily death? Was that rescinded? Did not Adam die that death, as do all his
posterity? Could it be any other than the sentence of eternal death and damnation, which, though it
passed, was not executed on him, through the grace and forgiveness of God? Since then, according to
Tertullian, this was the sentence pronounced on Adam, and he has made all his posterity partakers
of it, I have done him no injury by my translation; besides, in the place before us, Tertullian is
speaking to and of the soul, and not the body; for he immediately adds,[20] “Thou art sensible of
thy destroyer.” And a little after, “We affirm that thou wilt remain after this life is ended, and
wait for the day of judgment; and, according to thy deserts, shall be assigned either to torment or
rest, both which will be for ever.” Upon the whole, we see that this writer had no reason to say, that
Tertullian everywhere declares the sentence of a bodily death alone to be what was pronounced on
Adam in the beginning; or that he ever supposes the divine sentence of condemnation pronounced
against man in the beginning, to concern the body and bodily death only, and never supposes it to
respect the eternal death of body and soul hereafter.
This writer, unwilling to let slip an opportunity, or seeming one, of reproaching me, says, that I have
ventured to translate a passage of Dr. Whitby’s but not without a mistake; whereas I have not
pretended to give an exact translation of the passage, but only the sense of it, and in that, it seems,
I am mistaken: How so? I say, “the learned Doctor was of opinion, that what he has wrote in the
treatise was almost above the capacities of the common people.” This man says his words are these:
“Seeing these things which I shall say of original sin, for the most part, exceed the capacity of the
vulgar.” Well, if they, for the most part, exceed, then surely they must be almost above the capacity
of the vulgar. Should a person meet with this passage in Terence, fere ruri se continet, which this
author mentions, and should render it, “he keeps almost always in the country,” would it not be all
one as if it was rendered, “he keeps for the most part, or usually, in the country?” And so, if he
should on this scrap of Latin, ut fere fit, and translate it, “as it almost always falls out;” would it
not be the same as if it was translated, “as it usually, or for the most part, falls out?” A man that
can be grave in such observations as these, whatever opinion he may have of himself as a very
learned critic, must be set down for a solemn trifler.
I pass on (having nothing to do with his reasons for translating Dr. Whitby’s book, nor with the
translation itself) to,
II. The next charge exhibited against me, which is impertinence, pretending I have alleged
testimonies from the ancients beside my purpose, and particularly from Clemens, Barnabas, Ignatius,
Justin, and Lactantius, which shall be re-examined. And,
1. Clemens addressed the Corinthians, to whom he writes, as persons “called and sanctified by the
will of God;” which translation of his words is censured as inaccurate, though perfectly agreeable to
the version of Patricius Junius, a man of great erudition, revised by that very learned hand, Dr.
John Fell, bishop of Oxford, who renders them, as I have done, vocatis et sanctificatis voluntate
divina; yet this poor creature has the assurance and vanity to suggest, that his own translation is
most exact, and this very loose, obscure, and inaccurate; but it is plain what makes him uneasy with
this version, because he observes, it “makes it look as if both the calling and sanctification were
ascribed here to the will of God;” and truly so it does, and that very rightly: and why should the man
boggle at this, since Clemens, in the passage next cited by me, expressly says of the Corinthians,
that they were “called by the will of God in Christ Jesus?” whence it is clear, that not only
sanctification, but vocation, is ascribed by him to the will of God. But then, it seems, this vocation is
to be understood, not of internal, effectual calling, but of the outward call of the gospel. To which
may be replied, that persons may be called externally, by the preaching of the gospel, who are
never sanctified; but then those who are sanctified, are internally called, are called with a holy
calling, or are sanctified in and by their effectual vocation; and since these Corinthians were
sanctified as well as called, their vocation cannot be understood of a mere outward call, by the
ministry of the word; but of an eternal, efficacious call, by the Spirit and grace of God. If this will
not do, it is suggested, that sanctification, in this passage, does not design regeneration, conversion,
or any internal work of the Spirit of God upon the soul; but expiation and pardon of sin, through
the sacrifice of Christ; the words of Clemens being an allusion to, and the sense of the same, with
Hebrews 10:10. Though one should rather think that Clemens, writing to the Corinthians, as the
apostle Paul had done before, should copy after him, and in his addresses to them make use of the
same characters, and in the same sense, as he does 1 Corinthians 1:2, where we find both these
words, kletois and egiasmenois, called and sanctified; and the rather, because Clemens had this
epistle in his view when he wrote, makes mention of it, and exhorts the Corinthians to consider it.
[21] It is therefore most natural to conclude, that Clemens, using the same words as the apostle did,
in an epistle written to the same persons, should design the same things by them, namely, their
effectual calling to be saints, and their sanctification through the Spirit and grace of Christ; and
then what is become of the charge of impertinence? why, truly, this passage is still nothing to the
point, since none of the Remonstrants pretend that any person can be sanctified, but by the will of
God: to which I have made answer, that they will not affirm, that any person can be sanctified by
the will of God, without the cooperation of man’s will, by which, according to them, grace becomes
effectual; whereas Clemens attributes vocation and sanctification entirely to the will of God: when
I add, that the Remonstrants affirm, that the difference of calling grace in man lies not so much in
the will of God as in the will of man; and that it is no absurdity to say, that a saint is distinguished
from an unregenerate man by his own will; in affirming which, this writer says I say what is weak
and false, and which no Remonstrant ever used; but in all these I am supported by the following
testimonies out of their own mouths; they affirm that[22] “the holy Scriptures requires especially,
to the opening of the heart, the cooperation of man; that co-operation which proceeds from
preventing grace, for if God commands man to open his heart in conversion, it is certain that that
operation is not effected by God, without the consent of man’s will.” Corvinus, the Remonstrant,
asserts that,[23] “supposing all the operations which God uses to work conversion in us, yet
conversion so remains in our power, that we may not be converted.” He denies[24] “that the
difference of calling grace is not so placed in the will of man as in the will of God; and expressly
uses these words,[25] “It is no absurdity that a man should be distinguished by his own will from an
unbeliever.” Grevinchovius, the remonstrant, affirms,[26] that “it is not foreign from Scripture and
truth, if any one should assert that believers, not indeed of themselves, or by themselves, yet do
distinguish themselves.” And in reply to these words, “Who hath made thee to differ? he says,[27] I
make myself to differ, since I could resist God and divine pre-determination, and yet have not
resisted, and why may not I glory in it as my own?” The same writer also says, that “the effect of
grace ordinary depends on some act of the will, as a previous condition, sine qua non;” and that[28]
“no other common cause of the whole complex together can be given beside the liberty of the will.”
And again,[29] that “the will of itself alone, by a certain previous motion, determines grace: when
we say,” adds he, “that the will determines grace, we mean nothing else than that the will freely
performs its concourse with cooperating grace; or that the will so co-operates, as that it might not
cooperate, and so, by not so cooperating, hinder the co-operation of grace.” Many more citations of
the like kind might be made, but these may suffice. Since, then, they ascribe conversion, or calling
grace, so much to the will of man, as to give it the turning point in it, as to make conversion
dependent on it, for so Grevinchovius[30] allows, “you will say,” observes he, “that in this way of
working, even God himself, in some measure depends upon the will. I grant it,” he replies, “as to the
act of free determination.” It therefore cannot be saying either a weak or false thing of the
Remonstrants, that they may make the difference of calling grace to lie not so much in the will of
God as in the will of man.
not do, it is suggested, that sanctification, in this passage, does not design regeneration, conversion,
or any internal work of the Spirit of God upon the soul; but expiation and pardon of sin, through
the sacrifice of Christ; the words of Clemens being an allusion to, and the sense of the same, with
Hebrews 10:10. Though one should rather think that Clemens, writing to the Corinthians, as the
apostle Paul had done before, should copy after him, and in his addresses to them make use of the
same characters, and in the same sense, as he does 1 Corinthians 1:2, where we find both these
words, kletois and egiasmenois, called and sanctified; and the rather, because Clemens had this
epistle in his view when he wrote, makes mention of it, and exhorts the Corinthians to consider it.
[21] It is therefore most natural to conclude, that Clemens, using the same words as the apostle did,
in an epistle written to the same persons, should design the same things by them, namely, their
effectual calling to be saints, and their sanctification through the Spirit and grace of Christ; and
then what is become of the charge of impertinence? why, truly, this passage is still nothing to the
point, since none of the Remonstrants pretend that any person can be sanctified, but by the will of
God: to which I have made answer, that they will not affirm, that any person can be sanctified by
the will of God, without the cooperation of man’s will, by which, according to them, grace becomes
effectual; whereas Clemens attributes vocation and sanctification entirely to the will of God: when
I add, that the Remonstrants affirm, that the difference of calling grace in man lies not so much in
the will of God as in the will of man; and that it is no absurdity to say, that a saint is distinguished
from an unregenerate man by his own will; in affirming which, this writer says I say what is weak
and false, and which no Remonstrant ever used; but in all these I am supported by the following
testimonies out of their own mouths; they affirm that[22] “the holy Scriptures requires especially,
to the opening of the heart, the cooperation of man; that co-operation which proceeds from
preventing grace, for if God commands man to open his heart in conversion, it is certain that that
operation is not effected by God, without the consent of man’s will.” Corvinus, the Remonstrant,
asserts that,[23] “supposing all the operations which God uses to work conversion in us, yet
conversion so remains in our power, that we may not be converted.” He denies[24] “that the
difference of calling grace is not so placed in the will of man as in the will of God; and expressly
uses these words,[25] “It is no absurdity that a man should be distinguished by his own will from an
unbeliever.” Grevinchovius, the remonstrant, affirms,[26] that “it is not foreign from Scripture and
truth, if any one should assert that believers, not indeed of themselves, or by themselves, yet do
distinguish themselves.” And in reply to these words, “Who hath made thee to differ? he says,[27] I
make myself to differ, since I could resist God and divine pre-determination, and yet have not
resisted, and why may not I glory in it as my own?” The same writer also says, that “the effect of
grace ordinary depends on some act of the will, as a previous condition, sine qua non;” and that[28]
“no other common cause of the whole complex together can be given beside the liberty of the will.”
And again,[29] that “the will of itself alone, by a certain previous motion, determines grace: when
we say,” adds he, “that the will determines grace, we mean nothing else than that the will freely
performs its concourse with cooperating grace; or that the will so co-operates, as that it might not
cooperate, and so, by not so cooperating, hinder the co-operation of grace.” Many more citations of
the like kind might be made, but these may suffice. Since, then, they ascribe conversion, or calling
grace, so much to the will of man, as to give it the turning point in it, as to make conversion
dependent on it, for so Grevinchovius[30] allows, “you will say,” observes he, “that in this way of
working, even God himself, in some measure depends upon the will. I grant it,” he replies, “as to the
act of free determination.” It therefore cannot be saying either a weak or false thing of the
Remonstrants, that they may make the difference of calling grace to lie not so much in the will of
God as in the will of man.
The other passage cited by me out of Clemens being, in that clause of it for which I cite it, the same
with the former, since that is pertinent to my purpose, this must be also, and I therefore need not
say any thing more about it; only whereas I have once (not more than once, as this man says)
elsewhere cited it, to prove that according to Clemens good works are unnecessary in point of
justification. This writer is pleased to make a digression from his subject, and observe, that this
passage is full against the doctrine I embrace, will not serve my purpose against the person I
opposed; and on the contrary, is a strong bulwark in defense of the Remonstrants, who hold that
persons are not justified by works without faith, nor by faith without works; but by faith
accompanied with, and productive of, good works. To all which I reply, that this passage of Clemens
is not, in the least, against any doctrine I embrace, but entirely agreeable: the doctrine of
justification by faith, in the Scripture sense of it, is what I hold and maintain; nor are any thoughts
and sentiments of mine concerning justification inconsistent with it. The passage is also full to my
purpose for which I cited it, against my antagonist, which was to show, that good works were not
necessary to salvation, as the antecedent to the consequent: but, above all, it is surprising that the
passage should be thought to be a strong bulwark in defense of the Remonstrants, since Clemens
expressly says, “We are justified not by our piety, nor by our good works, which we have done in
holiness of heart; but by that faith, by which the Almighty God hath justified all from the
beginning;” by which expressions he excludes all works from our justification; yea, such as believers
themselves perform, which spring from the best principles, from holiness of heart, and are done in
the best manner, even works which spring from faith, and are produced by it: for, can there be
holiness of heart where there is no faith, any more than there can be faith where there is no holiness
of heart? If the Remonstrants have no stronger bulwarks than this, they are most miserably
defended in this article.
2. Barnabas is the next ancient writer mentioned, from whom I have cited a passage, to prove the
weakness and corruption of human nature before faith; and here a hideous outcry is raised, of an
egregious blunder, false translation, want of sense, and I know not what, through a repetition of the
word idolatry; and all this is aggravated by its being in my fourth volume,[31] and retained in my
postscript, after I had revised the translation; whereas, upon examination, it will appear the
blunder is his, and not mine; and that he has not consulted the original Greek of Barnabas, but the
old Latin translation. The Greek of Barnabas, as it stands in the edition of the very learned Isaac
Vossius, is as follows: —Pro tou emas pisteusai to Theo, en emon to katoiketerion tes kardias
phtharton kai asthenes — oti en pleres men eidololatrias oikos, eidololatria en oikos diamonion, dis
to poiein osa en enantia to Theo; which I must again render, “Before we believed in God, the
habitation of our heart was corrupt and weak; for it was a house full of idolatry, and idolatry was
the house of devils; wherefore we do, or did, such things as were contrary to God.” Indeed the word
idolatria is omitted in the old Latin version of Barnabas, which is this: Antequam crederemus Deo
erat habitatio nostra corrupta et infirma — quia pleni eramus adorationibus idolorum et srat domus
doemoniorum, propter quod faceremus, quae Deo essent contraria. Now where is the egregious
blunder? and who is the blunderer? or, where is the impertinence of the passage? Does it not
clearly and fully express the corruption and weakness of man before he believes, or has the grace
of God implanted in him, for which purpose it was cited? He next finds fault with the version of the
latter part of the passage, and in a very magisterial way says, the words will never bear such a
translation, without giving any reason for his so saying; but why should not dia to poiein be rendered
‘wherefore we do,’ or did, rather than ‘forasmuch as we have done,’ since the verb is of the present,
and not of the preter-perfect tense. The reason of his being uneasy with my translation is pretty
evident, because it leaves his charge of impertinence utterly insupportable. One would think he
might have made use of softer words than those railing ones, of ignorance and dishonesty; but such is
modern charity! As for the passage in Barnabas he refers me to, when he says, “When God has
received us by the remission of our sins, he then gives us another form, so as to have souls like the
soul of an infant:” this is only to be understood in a comparative sense, in like manner, as Matthew
18:3, and 19:14, 1 Corinthians 14:20, and clearly expresses the power and efficacy of divine grace,
in forming the new creature in regeneration; for which purpose I have cited it in this my fourth Part.
3. Ignatius comes next under consideration, from whom I have cited a passage which agrees with
those out of Clemens Romanus, and which is allowed to be so by this author, and since they are to my
purpose, as has been proved, this must be also: but whereas there are three other passages besides,
which are produced by me, this man has thought fit to examine them likewise. In the first of these,
Ignatius advises the church of Smyrna to avoid some very wicked persons he describes as beasts in
the shape of men, and “only to pray for them, if so be they may repent, which is very difficult; but
Jesus Christ, our true life,” says he, “has the power of this;” which words are cited, not only to show
the difficulty of such wicked persons obtaining repentance, and which this author allows, even such
a difficulty as amounts to an impossibility; an impossibility as great as is in the Ethiopian to change
his skin, or the leopard his spots; but also to show that Christ, who is our life, who has quickened us,
and given us repentance unto life, or we had never had it, has the sole power of it; and who, as he has
given repentance to such who may not have been such notorious sinners, or they would never have
repented of themselves; so he is able to give it to the most profligate wretches, and which,
therefore, is the argument or encouragement to pray for such. The next passage of Ignatius is,
“They that are carnal, cannot do the things that are spiritual; nor they that are spiritual, do the
things that are carnal;” from whence, this writer says, I infer, that men in a carnal state have no
power to do any thing that is spiritual: it is very right, so I do, and that justly: but then, it is said,
the former part of the citation cannot intend this, and more than the latter part of it can mean, that
a spiritual man has no power to do a wicked action; and therefore can never intend, that a carnal
man cannot cease to be carnal, and become spiritual, and then do spiritual things. To which I reply,
that a carnal man has nothing that is spiritual in him, and therefore can do nothing that is spiritual;
but a spiritual man has both flesh and spirit in him, that which is carnal and that which is spiritual.
Now when the carnal part prevails, it puts a man upon doing of carnal things, as in the case of David
referred to; but then this same man, as spiritual, and when in a spiritual frame, and in the exercise
of spiritual grace, according to Ignatius, cannot do carnal things; and which is the sense of the
apostle John (1 John 3:9), Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in
him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. We do not deny that a carnal man may cease to be
carnal, become spiritual, and then do spiritual things; but then we affirm that he cannot cease to be
carnal, become spiritual, and do spiritual things, but by the grace of God, and not by his own power
and strength. The last citation from Ignatius, and which is no marginal reading, but stands in the
body of Vossius’s edition, is, that “the Christian is not the work of persuasion, but of greatness;”
that is, as I explain it, of the exceeding greatness of God’s power, referring to Ephesians 1:19, to
which I am inclined to think Ignatius refers; where the word megethos, used by him, is to be taken
in this sense; our author, from Mr. Whiston and Archbishop Wake, interprets it of fortitude and
courage in times of persecution. The place referred to, as a parallel one, to support this sense, is
not to the purpose, where Ignatius says, “They that profess themselves to be Christians, shall be
seen by what they do; for now it is not the business of a profession, but it is through the power of
faith, if any man is found to be a Christian to the end; by which he means, that it is not by a mere
outward profession, but by the power and strength of faith, that a Christian continues and
perseveres to the end. Nor is there any mention of peismone, or megethos, or any thing that answers
to them, in the passage. But when this author suggests that I have left out these words, “especially
when he is hated by the world;” and if purposely, he says, it will be a full proof that I am not
overstocked with integrity; he is guilty of a vile piece of slander, and is a glaring proof of his
having a very small share of integrity himself: what guilt, shame, and confusion, must rise up in him,
when I have produced the whole passage, as it stands in my book, thus: “The Christian is not the
work of persuasion, but of greatness, of the exceeding greatness of God’s power, which is
wonderfully displayed in making the Christian, in continuing, preserving, and supporting him as such,
especially,” as he observes, “when he is hated by the world!”
purpose, as has been proved, this must be also: but whereas there are three other passages besides,
which are produced by me, this man has thought fit to examine them likewise. In the first of these,
Ignatius advises the church of Smyrna to avoid some very wicked persons he describes as beasts in
the shape of men, and “only to pray for them, if so be they may repent, which is very difficult; but
Jesus Christ, our true life,” says he, “has the power of this;” which words are cited, not only to show
the difficulty of such wicked persons obtaining repentance, and which this author allows, even such
a difficulty as amounts to an impossibility; an impossibility as great as is in the Ethiopian to change
his skin, or the leopard his spots; but also to show that Christ, who is our life, who has quickened us,
and given us repentance unto life, or we had never had it, has the sole power of it; and who, as he has
given repentance to such who may not have been such notorious sinners, or they would never have
repented of themselves; so he is able to give it to the most profligate wretches, and which,
therefore, is the argument or encouragement to pray for such. The next passage of Ignatius is,
“They that are carnal, cannot do the things that are spiritual; nor they that are spiritual, do the
things that are carnal;” from whence, this writer says, I infer, that men in a carnal state have no
power to do any thing that is spiritual: it is very right, so I do, and that justly: but then, it is said,
the former part of the citation cannot intend this, and more than the latter part of it can mean, that
a spiritual man has no power to do a wicked action; and therefore can never intend, that a carnal
man cannot cease to be carnal, and become spiritual, and then do spiritual things. To which I reply,
that a carnal man has nothing that is spiritual in him, and therefore can do nothing that is spiritual;
but a spiritual man has both flesh and spirit in him, that which is carnal and that which is spiritual.
Now when the carnal part prevails, it puts a man upon doing of carnal things, as in the case of David
referred to; but then this same man, as spiritual, and when in a spiritual frame, and in the exercise
of spiritual grace, according to Ignatius, cannot do carnal things; and which is the sense of the
apostle John (1 John 3:9), Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in
him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. We do not deny that a carnal man may cease to be
carnal, become spiritual, and then do spiritual things; but then we affirm that he cannot cease to be
carnal, become spiritual, and do spiritual things, but by the grace of God, and not by his own power
and strength. The last citation from Ignatius, and which is no marginal reading, but stands in the
body of Vossius’s edition, is, that “the Christian is not the work of persuasion, but of greatness;”
that is, as I explain it, of the exceeding greatness of God’s power, referring to Ephesians 1:19, to
which I am inclined to think Ignatius refers; where the word megethos, used by him, is to be taken
in this sense; our author, from Mr. Whiston and Archbishop Wake, interprets it of fortitude and
courage in times of persecution. The place referred to, as a parallel one, to support this sense, is
not to the purpose, where Ignatius says, “They that profess themselves to be Christians, shall be
seen by what they do; for now it is not the business of a profession, but it is through the power of
faith, if any man is found to be a Christian to the end; by which he means, that it is not by a mere
outward profession, but by the power and strength of faith, that a Christian continues and
perseveres to the end. Nor is there any mention of peismone, or megethos, or any thing that answers
to them, in the passage. But when this author suggests that I have left out these words, “especially
when he is hated by the world;” and if purposely, he says, it will be a full proof that I am not
overstocked with integrity; he is guilty of a vile piece of slander, and is a glaring proof of his
having a very small share of integrity himself: what guilt, shame, and confusion, must rise up in him,
when I have produced the whole passage, as it stands in my book, thus: “The Christian is not the
work of persuasion, but of greatness, of the exceeding greatness of God’s power, which is
wonderfully displayed in making the Christian, in continuing, preserving, and supporting him as such,
especially,” as he observes, “when he is hated by the world!”
4. Justin Martyr is another ancient writer from whom I have cited passages, showing that the
Scriptures, and the doctrines contained in them, are not to be understood without the Spirit and
grace of God. The first of these I freely own, and I never gainsaid it, does most clearly express,
that the doctrines of the sacred writings are such as could never be discovered by the light of
nature, nor without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; but then, since these writings contain such
great and divine things, as Justin says, exceeding the natural knowledge and understanding of men, it
follows, that they can only be spiritually discerned, through the assistance of the Spirit of God, the
dictator of them; which, as it is the sense of the apostle Peter (2 Pet. 1:20, 21), so it is of this holy
martyr, as will fully appear from what he elsewhere says, notwithstanding what this man has said to
the contrary; for, in the very next citation from him, Justin declares that “he understood the
Scriptures by the grace of God alone, which was given to him, and not through any natural or
acquired parts of his.” This man believes that the word charis, which he renders favor, and I have
translated grace, for which he charges me with unskillfulness, how justly, let others judge, never
signifies, throughout Justin’s works, the operations or assistances of the Spirit: but his faith and
judgment in this matter are of very little weight and significance. The learned Scultetus[32]
believed otherwise, and so did the famous Vossius, and whom the men of his party cite with great
applause, when they meet with any thing in him that serves their turn: his words are these,[33]
“Justin, in his dialogue with Trypho, asserts, that the outward preaching of the word, or reading of
the Scriptures, is not sufficient, but that besides them, the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit
is requisite; for thus he writes, Do ye think, O men, that we could ever have understood the things
contained in the Scriptures, unless by the will of him that wills these things elabomen charin tou
noesai, we had received grace to understand them?” And in some other place before this he had said
the same; “Unless one should take upon him, meta megales charitos tes para Theou, ‘with that great
or wonderful grace which is of God,’ to understand the things which are said or done by the
prophets; it will not avail him, to seem to relate their words or facts, unless he can also give a
reason of them.” These, with some others of the like nature, I have cited in my book,[34] and have
referred him to them in my postscript, of which he has not taken the least notice, being, no doubt,
convinced in his own mind, that they were clear testimonies against him. Besides, were charis to be
rendered favor, what could that favor be, to understand the Scriptures, but the illumination of the
blessed Spirit?
The third passage cited by me, which directs to pray that “the gates of light, that is, the
Scriptures, might be opened, since they are not seen or known by all, except God and his Christ give
an understanding of them.” This he owns sounds something more to the purpose, though he afterwards
says, most probably it has no such meaning, at least it is very uncertain whether it has or not. But
that this also may not pass without some reproachful censure, he represents me as here blundering
on according to custom, because I took these words to be an address of Justin’s to Trypho; whereas,
he says, they are Justin’s advice to a Gospel preacher. Now, who is most likely to blunder in this
matter, he or I? Is it probable that Justin should give such advice to a gospel preacher, one that.
was more knowing than himself at that time, and who was then instructing him? or, is it not much
more likely that he should thus address Trypho, the blind, ignorant Jew, with whom he was
conversing, and relating some matters of fact respecting himself? But, indeed, the truth of the case
is this, the words are not spoken by Justin at all, either to Trypho or to a gospel preacher; but they
are the words of a Christian man, whether a gospel preacher is not so manifest, to Justin himself,
whilst a heathen philosopher, who had been instructing him in the Christian religion, and closes with
these words; upon which Justin immediately observes, that this man having said these, and many
other things, which he had not then time to relate, departed from him, charging him to pursue those
things, and he never saw him any more; which, with what he had said before, made such an impression
on him, as to engage his affections to the prophets and Christians, and issued in his conversion.
Two other passages being cited by me out of an epistle of Justin’s to Diognetus, showing the
impossibility of obtaining life and salvation of ourselves, by our own works, or any other way than
by Christ; this man represents this epistle as doubtful and uncertain, whether it was Justin’s or no;
whereas Sylburgins[35] formerly thought it savored of Justin’s spirit and genius: and the very
learned[36] Fabricus of late could see no reason why it should not be thought to be his; and the
famous Scultetus[37] says, that with the common consent of all, that, and also the epistle to Zenas,
which this man blunderingly calls the epistle of Zenas, and which he likewise represents as dubious,
were ascribed to Justin; by which learned writer also the passage out of the epistle to Zenas is
twice[38] produced, and that for the same purpose for which I have cited it.
5. Lactantius is the last of the ancients excepted to by our author under this ad, from whom I have
cited three passages, to prove that man is in such a state of blindness and darkness, that it is
impossible he should have a knowledge of spiritual things without divine teachings. And the first of
them fully expresses that such is the condition and situation of the mind, or soul of man, that “it
cannot of itself apprehend or receive the truth, unless it be thought by some other;” where
Lactantius is speaking, not of the inability of the mind to discover truth without a revelation, but to
comprehend, or apprehend, receive, or embrace truth when it is revealed; wherefore he argues, that
the teacher must be heavenly, and not earthly, and have both virtue and knowledge. The second of
them, in which he says, that “man cannot, of himself, come to the knowledge of the truth, unless he is
taught of God,” the excellent[39] Scultetus understands as I do, to intend, not the necessity of a
revelation to lead men to a knowledge of the truth, but of divine teachings to understand the
revelation made; his words are these: “Concerning the understanding of the Christian religion, very
remarkable is that saying of his, Man of himself cannot come to this knowledge, unless he is taught
of God.” The third of them, in which Lactantius asserts, that the knowledge of truth, and of heavenly
“things, cannot be perceived by man, unless God teaches him,” is of the same kind with the former,
and expressed in almost the same words, and is to understood in the same manner.
But, it seems, did these passages of Justin and Lactantius prove ever so clearly the necessity of
grace, or the assistance of the Spirit to understand the Scriptures, they must still be impertinent;
since the Remonstrants never deny this, nor will they contest such a proposition. This is not a slip
of his pen, but what he repeats over and over, and most manifestly betrays his ignorance of the
writings and sentiments of the Remonstrants, who have very openly expressed themselves on this
head, in the following manner:[40] “Such is the clearness and perspicuity of the Scriptures, in
doctrines, especially which are necessary to be understood in order to everlasting salvation, that all
readers, not only learned men but private persons (that are but endued with common sense and
judgment,) may sufficiently attain the meaning of them, provided they do not suffer themselves to
be blinded with prejudice, vain confidence, and other evil affections.” And when the Anti-
Remonstrants[41] charged this passage with smelling rank of Pelagianism and Socinianism, and urged
that they confounded the literal and spiritual sense of the Scriptures, the Remonstrants[42] reply,
by arguing after this manner, that if there is “a sense of Scripture super-infused, it cannot be the
sense of the words of Scripture, but the sense of the Spirit of God: or if it is the sense of the
words of Scripture, how or wherein does it differ from the literal sense? To what purpose is it
super-infused? Is it that the sense may be understood, which is understood already? This is trifling.
Is it that it may be more clearly understood? But the sense lies in something indivisible; should you
say, this light of the Holy Spirit is pre-requisite to understand the true sense, you increase the
absurdity.” Episcopius, a leading man among the Remonstrants, says[43] many things to the same
purpose; hence it most clearly appears, that all such passages of the ancients, which express the
necessity of grace and the assistance of the Spirit to understand the Scriptures, are most
pertinently alleged, being diametrically opposite to the sentiments of these men.
When I say, that the Remonstrants and Dr. Whitby allow of no supernatural grace infused, or
supernatural aid requisite to conversion and good works, besides objective evidence, respecting
truth to the understanding, and bringing it to remembrance; this man asks, with what face I could
say this, when the Remonstrants and Dr. Whitby assert supernatural grace in words and terms as
express as any of my party. Strange! why then has a controversy about it been continued for so
many years? But this is but a further proof, that he is utterly unacquainted with the writings and
tenets of those of his own party. The Remonstrants expressly deny that any grace is infused in
order to conversion, either into the understanding, or will, or affections. “As to the distinction,’’ say
they,[44] “of habitual and actual grace, this is rejected by us; since by habitual grace is meant such
an infusion of faith, hope, and love, into the will, as that a man may be said to obtain those habits
without any intervening operation of the will; there is no such thing in Scripture, this is a device of
the schoolmen.” Again, they say,[45] that “faith cannot be called the gift of God, unless in respect
of the actual infusion of it into our hearts, as the brethren, that is, the Anti-Remonstrants, profess
they understand it; that, indeed, we utterly deny.” Corvinus,[46] a noted one among them, expresses
himself thus: “Infusion of habits, or virtues, whether into the will, or into the understanding and
affection, if you regard ordinary conversion, is contrary to the use of means, by which God would
produce a new life in man.” And, says Grevinchovius,[47] another of them, “That there be any
intrinsic form, or any supernatural habit infused, raising and determining the natural faculty by its
own power and efficacy, this figment I do not admit of.” They do indeed own,[48] “that a
supernatural power is conferred on the will, and that hereby God immediately acts on the will,
provided this action does not necessitate the will antecedently, and take away the liberty and power
non valendi, of not willing or nilling,” which this man has falsely translated, willing. So that
notwithstanding this supernatural power, the will remains indifferent to will or not will, to act or
not act, believe or not believe, do well or not, and by this power it is only enabled to bring into act
its innate faculty of willing and nilling; for thus they say,[49] “Though God may so affect the will
by his word, and the internal operation of his Spirit, and confer the power of believing and
supernatural aid, and cause a man actually to believe, yet man can of himself reject this grace and
not believe, and so even perish through his own fault.” What kind of supernatural power or aid must
this be? And as for Dr Whitby, he affirms[50] that supernatural and infused habits, or Christian
virtues, are never styled grace in Scripture; and he humbly conceives,[51] that the inward operation
of the Holy Spirit consists in these two things, in representing divine truths, and in bringing them to
our remembrance; and further observes,[52] in a passage I referred this author to, though he has
thought fit to take no notice of it, “that any supernatural habits must be infused into us in an
instant, or that any other supernatural aid is requisite to the conversion of a sinner, besides the
fore-mentioned illumination of the Holy Spirit, and the impression which he makes upon our hearts
by the ideas which he raises in us, is that which my hypothesis by no means will allow; which ideas,
though they are raised by a physical operation, yet they are moral in their operations; even as a man’
s tongue, in speaking to persuade or dissuade another, performs a physical operation, though the
effect of it is only moral.”
The reader will easily see from hence in what sense Dr. Whitby is to be understood, when he says,
as this author has cited him, that “we become new creatures, is, indeed, effected by the
supernatural aid of the Spirit;” and with what face I could, and still say, that the Remonstrants and
Dr. Whitby, besides the moral suasion of the Word and Spirit, allow of no supernatural grace
infused, or supernatural aid requisite to conversion and good works.
This writer seems uneasy with me for representing the Remonstrants and Dr. Whitby as meaning no
more by the aids of the Spirit, and the grace of God, which they allow to be necessary to conversion
and good works, than what Pelagius called the grace of nature, or moral suasion; and produces a
large citation, which it is very probable somebody or another has helped him to, showing in what
manner the Remonstrants at the synod of Dort endeavored to clear themselves from the charge of
Pelagianism; from whence, it is manifest, that such a charge was exhibited against them; and,
notwithstanding all the color and artifice they made use of, they were not able to convince that
venerable body of men to the contrary, who continued to charge them with introducing Pelagianism;
and particularly, that they meant no more by grace, than external calling by the word, and internal
moral suasion by the Spirit, as appears from the Act of that Synod,[53] and which is fully evident
from these men’s own writings: “If the word of the gospel,” say they,[54] “is not the sole and only
ordinary means of conversion; but the internal and efficacious, or irresistible action of the Spirit
must concur; then it follows, that that, together with the word, is the means of conversion, or
collaterally works along with the word, by a distinct action from the action of the word; or the one
is subordinate to the other; neither of which can be asserted.” Again, after the power is conferred
on the will, before-mentioned, they say,[55] “We confess, that no other grace is owned by us to be
necessary, to draw out an act of faith, than that which is moral, or that which uses the word as an
instrument to produce faith.” Once more, they[56] say, “It may be disputed whether that is not the
most noble action respecting man, which is performed by persuasion and admonitions; and, whether it
is expedient that any other power should be used with man, maintaining the properties of the human
nature; and moreover, whether such an operation as Satan uses, would not be strong enough.” And,
says[57] Grevinchovius, “What hinders, but that moral grace alone may make natural men spiritual
ones?” These men, indeed, sometimes talk of special and supernatural grace; but can that be special,
which they say is universal and common to all men? Or supernatural, which produces no supernatural
effects, and which may be overcome and made of no effect, by that which is natural? But after all,
it seems the holy fathers of the Christian church always speak of God’s grace just as the
Remonstrants do: and that I have not cited, nor am able to cite, a single father who has said more
than the Arminians; whereas in Part IV., of the Cause of God and Truth, chapter 4, I have produced
not only one but many, who speak of regeneration and conversion, as owing entirely to powerful and
efficacious insuperable and unfrustrable grace, and not to moral suasion; to which I refer him and
the reader. And thus, having done with his impertinent charge, I go on.
III. To consider his next charge of weakness, in citing passages from the ancients, which only prove
that “by the fall of Adam, men are become prone to sin, and subject to a corporeal death:” but
supposing no more is proved by such passages; a proneness to sin is a corruption of nature, and if a
bodily death is inflicted as a punishment, than which there is not a greater corporeal punishment on
Adam’s posterity for his sin, they must be involved in the guilt of it, or that must be imputed to
them; otherwise, how should they be liable to such a punishment of death for it? Now the derivation
of a corrupt nature from Adam, and the imputation of the guilt of his sin to his posterity, are the
very things in the controversy we contend for; and if the Remonstrants will accede to these things,
they in a manner give up their cause. Should it be said, that though they allow of a proneness to sin,
yet not such a general corruption of nature as we plead for; and though they own that men are
become subject, through Adam’s sin, to a corporeal death, yet not to death in soul and body. I have
cited passages from the ancients, and referred this man to them, showing that men by the fall have
lost the image of God, even true reason, moral goodness, righteousness, and holiness; that they are
born sinners, yea, infected with sin before they are born; that they are under a spiritual darkness
and death, and held by the devil in hell for the sin of Adam, the fault of which is transferred to
them. To which this author has chiefly replied by referring me to Dr. Whitby’s Treatise of Original
Sin, particularly respecting the passages of Origen, Macarius the Egyptian, Athanasius, Basil,
Cyrill, and Optatus. Whose replies to these passages, as well as to some others of Origen and
Chrysostom, about which this man elsewhere so much blusters, are mere shifts and evasions, and
chiefly lie in setting other passages against them.
It will not be denied, nor is it to be wondered at, that there are some passages in those writers
which may seem to militate against this doctrine; for no controversy being moved about it, they
wrote without guard; but, if it was entirely unknown till the times of Austin, it is much there should
be any thing of it in their writings; wherefore, upon these considerations, I say again, and which was
before my sense, that one full testimony in favor of it, before the controversy was moved, is of
more weight than ten which may seem to be against it.
But to go on: this author replies to the passages referred to by to me, partly by saying of others
of them, as of Hilary of Poictiers, Victorinus Afer, and Gregory Nazianzen, that they are nothing to
the purpose; if the reader pleases to take his ipse dixit, his bare word for it; though the first of
these affirms, that sin and unbelief arise from the transgression of our first parents; that all
mankind are to be considered under the first man, and went astray when he did; and that man is
born under original sin, and the law of it; and the other represents man in a state of nature, as dead
through sin; and the third asserts, that all men sinned in Adam, fell by his sin out of paradise, were
condemned through his disobedience, and lost the heavenly image. The passages of the ancients
referred to which he has ventured to make some remarks upon, are those of Justin, Irenaeus, Hilary
the Deacon, Ambrose, and Mark the Eremite, which will be attended to.
1. Justin Martyr affirms,[58] that “we were born sinners:” which words this man says in one place I
have translated to a false sense; but in some pages after, when he had forgot what he had said
before, says, it may be translated either way; either “we were, or were made, or were born sinners:”
but be this as it will, the question, he says, will return, in what sense Justin uses the word sinners,
as it is now the question between us, in what sense St. Paul uses the word, Romans 5. I answer,
Justin does not use the word sinners for sufferers, in which sense our modern Arminians, silly
enough, make the apostle to use it in the above place; and I can scarcely think our author has front
enough to assert this, when he reads the passage in Justin, which stands thus; “We, who by him
(Christ) have access to God, have not received the carnal, but spiritual circumcision, which Enoch,
and those like him, kept; but we, seeing we were born sinners, have received it by baptism, through
the mercy of God.”
2. Irenaeus[59] has such a passage as this referred to by me, “Christ hath granted us salvation, that
what we lost in Adam, that is, to be after the image and likeness of God, we might receive in Christ
Jesus;” which this man, after Dr. Whitby, would have to be understood of the immortality of the
body, which is only a part of that image; whereas Irenaeus[60] elsewhere makes this likeness to be
in the whole man, body and soul, and particularly to consist in the reason of man, and the freedom of
his will, which, he says, he has lost; his words are these;[61] “Man being rational, el secundum hoc
similis Deo, ‘and in this respect like to God,’ and being made free in his will, and of his own power, is
himself the cause why he may become sometimes wheat, and sometimes chaff; wherefore he will be
justly condemned, because being made rational, he hath lost true reason; and living irrationally, he
acts contrary to the righteousness of God, giving himself up to every earthly spirit, and serving all
sorts of pleasures:” Feuardentius,[62] Irenseus’s annotator, interprets image, in the place in
dispute, of the excellent gifts of grace, righteousness, and godliness, bestowed on man in his
creation; it is therefore no piece of weakness, to cite or refer to such a passage, showing that man
has lost by the fall the image of God, which chiefly lies, according to this ancient writer, in the
freedom of his will, and the exercise of right reason.
3. Hilary, the Deacon, is another ancient writer cited and referred to by me, to prove that men are
held in hell by Satan for the sin of Adam: and here I am gravely reprimanded for translating inferi
“hell,” and not hades; but supposing the word inferi should not be used by Hilary, and that these
phrases apud inferos and in inferis are not to be met with in the passages referred to, as this man
has put them, as indeed they are not; with what shame and confusion must he appear, who makes such
large pretensions to accuracy, and takes every slight occasion, and indeed where there is none at all,
of charging others with blunders! Hilary’s words are these, speaking of sin being condemned by the
cross of Christ; “Hence,” says he, “the authority, as it were, of sin was taken away, by which it held
men (not apud inferos, as this man says, but) de inferno, in hell for the sin of Adam.” Again, “Being
delivered,” says he, from a state of darkness, that is, pulled (not inferis but) de inferno, ‘out of
hell,’ in which we were held by the devil, both for our own, and the sin of Adam, who is the father of
all sinners; we are translated by faith into the heavenly kingdom of the Son of God, that God might
show us with what love he loves us, when he lifts us up de imo tartari, ‘out of the lowest hell,’ and
introduces us into heaven with his own real Son.” Now, let Hilary mean what he will by infernus and
imum tartari, it is certain, that according to him, men are in the custody of the devil, and are in some
sort of punishment, propter delictum Adae, “for the sin of Adam.” which is what the passages were
cited for. This writer, after Dr. Whitby, and which he has taken from him, cites a passage of Hilary’
s in which he says,[63] that “we do not endure the second death in hell for Adam’s sin, but only by
occasion thereof it is exacted for our sins:” and I could direct him to another in the same
commentary,[64] where he says, delicto Adae multi tenentur a morte secunda in inferno inferiori;
many are held by the second death in the lowest hell for the sin of Adam.”
4. Ambrose is allowed to say some things of men’s deriving pollution and corruption from Adam, and
it is owned that some passages in him do declare that he thought mankind defiled in Adam, and that
they are undone and destroyed in him: but Ambrose not only declares that a corrupt nature is
derived from Adam, but also, that the fault of his transgression is transferred or imputed to his
posterity, as appears from what I have cited from him. As to what Ambrose says concerning infants
going to heaven, which he makes a doubt of, and being freed from punishment; it is to be hoped they
may, through the pardoning mercy of God, the blood of Christ, and the regenerating grace of the
Spirit, notwithstanding the corruption of their nature, and the imputation of Adam’s sin to them.
derived from Adam, but also, that the fault of his transgression is transferred or imputed to his
posterity, as appears from what I have cited from him. As to what Ambrose says concerning infants
going to heaven, which he makes a doubt of, and being freed from punishment; it is to be hoped they
may, through the pardoning mercy of God, the blood of Christ, and the regenerating grace of the
Spirit, notwithstanding the corruption of their nature, and the imputation of Adam’s sin to them.
5. Mark the Eremite is the last upon the list excepted to; who says, that “all men have been guilty of
the sin of Adam’s transgression, and have therefore been condemned to death, so that without Christ
they cannot be saved.” Our author desires to know where the Latin word for guilty is to be found in,
this passage: Mark’s words are these, cunctique peccato transgressionis fuerunt; which being
literally rendered is, “all have been in the sin of his transgression;” and is not the sense the same?
If they were in it, they must be guilty of it; for if not guilty, how should they be condemned on
account of it? for Mark adds, ideoque capitali sententia condemnati, “and therefore have been
capitally condemned,” or condemned to die, insomuch that without Christ they cannot be saved; not
merely from a corporeal death by the resurrection from the dead, which wicked men will partake
of, and yet not be saved; but from the second death, from wrath to come, which none will escape,
but such who are saved by Christ with a spiritual and eternal salvation.
The fourth charge brought against me by this writer, is great partiality in reciting all the passages
of Vossius which relate to original sin, without taking notice of Dr. Whitby’s replies to them. To
which I have answered, by observing and proving, that I have not recited all the passages of Vossius
relating to this point, nor has he all the passages I have cited; and that Dr. Whitby has not replied
to all the citations of Vossius, and has passed over many passages of the ancients which he refers to.
This author being shut up on every side, betakes himself to this miserable subterfuge, “that I have
mistaken his meaning;” which was, he says, that I have recited all the passages of Vossius concerning
original sin, which I have recited, without taking any notice of Dr. Whitby’s answers; which would
have been true if I had not recited one of Vossius’s citations; but certain it is, that he would have
had the reader understand, that I have recited every individual citation of Vossius; for in his margin
he observes, that I have copied him even to his mistakes, which he affirms, without pointing out one
single instance to support it.
The reply to my answer to his fifth charge has nothing in it worthy of any notice; only I would
observe, that to refer to passages of the ancients which seem to favor the Arminian scheme, if not
transcribed at length, is at one time chargeable with unfairness, and at another time it is weakness
to the last degree, to cite such passages from them, in which they seem to agree with their tenets,
and not denied by us. So determined is this man to cavil at any rate!

ENDNOTES
[1] Adv. Haeres, lib. 4, c. 5, p. 322.
[2] Ibid. c. 34, p. 500.
[3] Ibid. c. 16, p. 460.
[4] Treatise of Original Sin, p. 269.
[5] Adv. Julian. lib. i.c.l1.
[6] Hist. Pelag, par. 1, lib. 2, thes. 6. p. 152.
[7] Synopa. Pur. Theolog. disp. 15, thes. 8, p. 150.
[8] Annotat. in Irenaeum. p. 323.
[9] 1 Kings 8:38.
[10] Treatise, p. 176.
[11] De Anima, c. 39, p. 342.
[12] De Testimon. Ammiae, c. 3, p. 82.
[13] Vide Tertullian. de Resurreet. c. 6, p. 383; c. 18, p. 391; c. 26, p. 597; c. 52, p. 421.
[14] Liberum et sui arbitrii, et suae potestatis in-venio hominem a Deo institutum, nullam magis
imaginem et similitudinem De illo auimadvertens, quam ejusmodi status formam; neque enim facie et
corporalibus lineis tam variis in genere humano, ad uniformem Deum expressus est, sed in ea
substantia, quam ab ipso Deo traxit, id est, animae ad formam Dei respondentis et arbitrii sui
libertate et potestate signatus est. — Tertullian adv. Marcion. lib. 2, c. 5, p. 457. Oportebat igitur
imagmem et similitudinem Dei, liberi arbitrii, et suae potestatis institui, in qua et hoc ipsum, imago
et similitudo Dei deputaretur, arbitrii, scilicet libertas et potestas. — Ib, c. 6.
[15] Ideoque non habendo fidem, etiam quod vide. batur habere ademptum est illi, paradisi gratia et
familiaritas Dei, per quam omnia Dei cognovisset si obedissst. — Ib, c. 2, p. 454.
[16] Nam etsi Adam propter statum legis deditus morti est, sed spes ei salva est, dicente Dominoque,
ecce dam factus est tam quam unus ex nobis, de futra scilicet ad lectione hominis in divinitatem. —
Ib, c. 25, p. 473.
[17] De Praescript. Haeret. c. 52, p. 254.
[18] Nam Dens post tot, et ac tanta delicta humanae temeritatis a principe generis Adam auspicata,
post condemnatum hominem, cum seculi dote, post ejectum Paradiso mortique subjectum, qumn rursus
ad suam misericordiam maturavisset, jam inde in semetipso poenitentiam dedicavit, rescissa sententia
irsrum pritinarum, ignoscere pactus operi et imagini suae. — Ib, de Poenitentia, c. 2, p. 139, 140.
[19] Observ. in loc. p. 38.
[20] Sentis igitur perditorem tuum, affirmamus to manere post vitae dispunctionem et expectare
diem judicii, proque meritis aut cruciatui destinari aut refrigerio, utroque sempiterno. — Ib, de
Testimon. Animae, c. 3, p. 82.
[21] Epist. p. 106.
[22] Sacra Scriptura imprimis ad istam cordis apertionem requirit suergian, et co-operationem
humanam, inquam, eam, quae ex gratiae praevenientis vi proficiscitur, nam si homini praecipitur a
Deo, ut is in conversione cor suum aperiat, certum est, operationem istam non effici a Deo sine
cousensu humanae voluntatis. — Coll. Hag. art. 3. & 4. p. 274.
[23] Positis omnibus operationibus, quibus ad eam in nobis efficiendam Deus utitur, manet tamen
ipsa conversio ita in nostra potestate, ut possimus non converti. — Corv, ad. n. Boger par. 2. p. 263.
[24] Negatur diserimen gratiae vocantis non tam in hominis arbitrio positum esse quam in Dei
voluntate. — Ib, contra Tilen. p. 264.
[25] Non est absurdum hominem sua voluntate discerni a non credente. — Ib, p. 136.
[26] Non alienum est a Scripturn et veritate, si quis affirmat, fideles non quidem ex scipsis aut
persemetipsos, sametipsos tamen discernere. — Grevinchov, contr. Ames. p. 219. Quis to discernit?
in promptu causa est, ego meipsum discerno, quum enim Deo ac praedeterminationi divinae resistere
possem, non restiti tameu, at qui in eo quid ni liceat mihi tauquam de meo gloriari? — Ibid. p. 253.
[27] Imo ut coufidentius agam, dico effectum gratia ordinaria lege pendere ab actu aliquo arbitrii
ut praevia conaitione sine qua noa. — Ib, p. 198.
[28] Totius simul complexi causam communem dari non posse aliam praeter libertatem voluntatis. —
Ibid. p. 204.
[29] Arbitrium ex se solo, praevia quadam motione determinet gratiam. Eo quo diximus sensu
arbitrium determinare gratiam, nihil aliud est quam arbitrium libere praestare concursum suum
gratiae co-operanti, vel arbitrium ita co-operari, ut possit non co-operari, adeoque non co-operando
impedire co-operationem gratiae. — Ibid. p. 206.
[30] Dices in hoc operandi modo, Deum etiam quodam modo dependere a voluntats? Concedo,quoad
actum determinationis liberae. — Ib, p. 279.
[31] The first edition was in four volumes, etc.
[32] Medulla Patrum, par. 1, lib. 1, c. 14, p. 29.
[33] Justinus dialogo cum Tryphone docet, externam verbi praedicationem aut Scripturarum
lectionem minime sufficere, sed in super requiri internam Spiritus Sancti illuminationem sic enim
scribit, etc. — Voss. Pelag. Hist. par. 1, lib. 3, thes. 2, p. 272.
[34] Cause of God and Truth, part 4.
[35] Annotat. in Justin. p. 43.
[36] Bioliothee. Graec. vol. 5. lib. 5, c. 1. s. 15, p. 58.
[37] Medulla Patrum, par. 1, lib. 1, c. 1, p. 2.
[38] Page 32, 38.
[39] De intelligentia religionis Christianae praeclara ejus vox est, homo per scipsum, etc. — In lib.
10, c. 11, p. 341.
[40] Tanta est claritas ac perspicuitas in sensibus imprimis ad aeternam salutem intellectu
necessariis, ut omnes lectores, non docti tantum sed et idiotae (communi quidem sensu ac judicio
praediti) quantum satis est, mentem corum adsequi possiut, modo praejudicio, vona confidentia,
aliisque pluris affectionitus sese occaecari non sinant. — Remonstr, Confessio, c. 1, s. 14, p. 6.
[41] Censura Confessioni, c. 1, s, 14, p. 23, 24.
[42] Sensus ille superinfusus non erit sensus verborum Scripturae, sed sensus Spiritus Dei, aut si
est sensus verborum Scripturae, quomodo et quan re differt a sensu grammatico; Quorsum super
infunditur? An ut intelligatur sensus, qui jam intelligitur? Nugae. An ut clarius intelligatur? At
sensus in indivisibili consistit: si dicas, lumen hoc Spiritus Saucti praerequiri, ut verus sensus
intelligatur, auges absurditatem, — Examen. Censurae, c. 1, s, 14, p. 34.
[43] Disput, de Perspicuitate S. Script. thes, 1 & 3.
[44] Quod attinet distinctionem illam gratiae habitualis et actualis, ea a nobis rejicitur; siqidem per
habitualem gratiam intelligitur talis fidei, spei, charitatis in voluntatem infusio, ut citra ullam
intervenientem voluntatis operationem eos habitus adipisci dicatur homo. Nihil tale in Scriptura,
scholasticorum hoc figmentum est, etc. — Declaratio Seutent. Remonstr. circa .art. 3. & 4. p, 15.
[45] Eam non posse donum Dei appellari, uisi respectu aetualis infusionis n corda nostra, pront id
fratres se intelligere profitentur, id vero nos exserte negamus. — Coll. Hag. art. 3. & 4. p. 308.
[46] Infusiones habituum seu virtutum, tum in voluntatam, tum in intellectum et affectus (si
ordinariam conversionem spectes) repugnant mediorum, quibus Deus in homine novam vitam operari
vult, administrationi. — Corvinus adv. Walachros, p. 56.
[47] Formam quandam intrinsicum sive habitum quendam supernaturalem infusum, potentiam
naturalem elevantem ae determinantem vi et efficacitate sua, non admitto hoc figmentum. — Grev,
contr. Ames. p. 236
[48] Declaratio. Sentent. Remonstr. circa art. 3. & 4. p. 17.
[49] Licet ita voluntatem afficiat verbo et Spiritus sui operatione interna Deus, ut et potentiam
credendi sive vires supernaturalis conferat et hominem actu credere facit, tamen potuit homo ex se
gratiam istam adspernari et non credere, eoque etiam sua culpa perire. — Ibid, p. 2.
[50] Discourse, etc. p. 211.
[51] Ibid. p. 226.
[52] Ibid. p. 231.
[53] Acta Synod. Dordrecht. p. 243, 261, 306, 307.
[54] Si verbum evangeliin non est solum et unicum conversiouis medium ordinarium, sed actio
Spiritus Sancti interna et efficax sive irresistibilis concurrere debeat, tum sequitur, id quod una
cum verbo medium conversionis est vel collateraliter juxta verbum per actionem distinctam ab
actione verbi; vel alterumalteri subordinari; at qui nutrum horum dici potest. — Defensio Sentent.
Romonstr. circa art. 4. p. 128, 129.
[55] Fatemur aliam a nobis ad actum fidei eliciendum necessarium gratiam non agnosci quam moralem
sive eam, quae verbo tanquam instrumento ad fidem efficiendam utitur. — Ibid. p. 62.
[56] Posset quoque et hoc (ut a nonnullis fit) disputari, an non nobilissima sit actio ea circa hominem,
quae fit per inductionem et monelas et an expendiens sit, alia aliqua circa hominem vi uti, servatis
humanae naturae propritatibus ac proinde an non antis veheinens foret operatio, i talis esset, quali
Satan utitur. — Coll. Hag. art. 3. & 4. p. 291.
[57] Quid enim obstat, quominus vel sola gratia moralis istoa yucikouv, spirituales reddat? —
Grevinch. contra Ames, p. 297.
[58] Dialog. cum Tryph. p. 261.
[59] Adv. Haeres. 1. 3, c. 20, p. 282.
[60] Ibid. 1. 5, c. 6, p. 441.
[61] Adv. Haercs. 1. 4, c. 9, p. 326.
[62] Annotat. in Irenaeum, p. 285.
[63] Comment on Romans 5. p. 209.
[64] Comment on Romans 5. p. 272.